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Abstract 
In recent years activation of means-tested unemployment benefit recipients has be-
come a major issue of European labour market policy. We study the effect of partici-
pation in a new business start-up scheme for needy unemployed people in Ger-
many. The programme was introduced at the beginning of the year 2005 together 
with a new means-tested benefit system. We used data from administrative records 
to draw a sample of needy participants who entered the programme from February 
to April 2005 and of an adequate control group. Even though these data are quite 
rich in terms of information on the labour market performance and individual and 
household characteristics, they do not provide information on unsubsidised self-
employment. Therefore, using matching methods we estimate the impact of the pro-
gramme participation on the outcomes “neither being registered as unemployed nor 
as a job-seeker” and “no receipt of unemployment benefit II”. Our estimates imply 
that even by the time when nearly no participant receives the start-up subsidy any 
longer treatment reduces considerably the proportion of registered job-seekers and 
of means-tested benefit recipients among the treated. Moreover, there is no sub-
stantial variation of these effects over different population groups. 
 
JEL classification: C13, H43, J68 
 
Keywords: Propensity score matching, treatment effects, evaluation of active   
labour market policy, start-up subsidies, means-tested benefit recipients 
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1 Introduction 
Due to high and persistent unemployment in the last years German labour market 
policy reforms concentrated to a large extent on activation policies.1 One of the re-
forms was implemented with the introduction of the Social Code II. A new means-
tested benefit, the unemployment benefit II (UB II), was introduced at the start of the 
year 2005. It replaced the two former means-tested benefits, unemployment assis-
tance and social assistance. The reform emphasises activation policies.  
One of these activation policies is a subsidy to take-up jobs, the so called “Ein-
stiegsgeld”. It may be granted to needy unemployed both for starting their own busi-
ness as well as for entering contributory employment. However, in the year 2005 the 
latter option made up for less than 15 percent of the programme starts. Therefore, 
this paper deals only with effects of Einstiegsgeld as a start-up subsidy on partici-
pants. 
We study whether participation in the scheme improves the labour market perform-
ance of participants. The start-up subsidy can be paid for up to 24 months, though 
usually is received for much shorter periods. In 2005 less than 20 thousand people 
started the programme, which was a low number compared with an average stock of 
about 2.8 million needy unemployed. The inflow into the Einstiegsgeld start-up 
scheme is also low compared with the inflow into two start-up programmes for un-
employment insurance (UI) benefit recipients, the bridging allowance and the “Exis-
tenzgründungszuschuss” with more than 150 thousand and more than 90 thousand 
programme starts in 2005, respectively. 
There are various reasons to believe that many potential needy entrepreneurs did 
not receive the subsidy. First of all the UB II agencies who have to grant the subsidy 
were just set-up at the start of the year 2005 with partly inexperienced staff and a 
huge task of implementing the reform. Moreover, the start-up programme was new 
and case managers had no experience with implementing it. For these reasons it is 
likely that a large number of UB II recipients who potentially could have set-up their 
own business were not entitled to the subsidy.  
Our study estimates the effect of programme participation using matching methods. 
The effects are estimated for the inflow into the self-employment scheme during the 
months February to April 2005. We only regard programme participants if they were 
unemployed on 31st January 2005 and received UB II at that time. The potential con-
trol group members stem from a 20 percent random sample of needy persons in the 
UB II unemployment stock at the end of January 2005. Of course we excluded all 
                                                
1  A comprehensive description of recent institutional changes of German labour market 
policy can be found in Jacobi and Kluve (2007). These reforms are well known in Ger-
many as the Hartz reforms, as many of them were proposed by a commission that was 
led by Peter Hartz, head of the personnel executive committee of Volkswagen.  
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people from the stock of needy unemployed, who entered the self-employment pro-
gramme from February to April 2005. However, controls may enter this programme 
at later points in time. Hence, we estimate the effect of joining the programme from 
February to April 2005.  
In contrast to most evaluation studies that estimate programme effects with adminis-
trative data, we can incorporate considerable information on the household of pro-
gramme participants and control individuals. With the introduction of the Social 
Code II and a related new data collection system at the local unemployment bene-
fit II agencies for the first time administrative micro data on all members of needy 
households is available in Germany.2 In turn any member of an UB II recipient 
household can be tracked over time. Hence, for our treatments and controls also 
data on their partners or other household members on employment, unemployment, 
active labour market programme participation or benefit receipt from other adminis-
trative data sources can be retrieved for our analysis.  
We are mainly concerned with effects of programme participation on the outcomes 
neither registered as unemployed nor job-seeking and no UB II receipt. Unfortu-
nately we cannot focus on an outcome like unsubsidized self-employment, which 
would be best suited to evaluate the success of the start-ups. This piece of informa-
tion is not available in the administrative data. But the two outcomes we focus on 
provide some evidence on whether due to the subsidy participants were integrated 
successfully into the labour market. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section two describes the institutional set-up of 
the new unemployment benefit II and of the Einstiegsgeld programme. In section 
three, we provide a short literature review on the effectiveness of self-employment 
programmes in Germany. Section four discusses theoretical considerations for our 
analysis together with some key hypotheses of our study. The methods and data are 
described in section five. We discuss the results of our analysis in section six and 
briefly summarize and conclude in section seven.  
2 Institutional Framework 
With the introduction of the Social Code II at the start of the year 2005 major reforms 
of the German unemployment compensation system came into force (the so called 
“Hartz IV”-reforms). A new means-tested benefit system was introduced: The unem-
                                                
2  Before the year 2005 administrative micro data of the Federal Labour Agency contained 
information on unemployment assistance recipients, but not on the members of their 
needy household. Systematic administrative micro data on social assistance recipients 
from all municipalities, which were responsible for this benefit scheme, were not avail-
able. With the exception of 69 municipalities, since 2005 the Federal Labour Agency and 
municipalities are jointly responsible for the new benefit scheme, such that register data 
of the local UB II agencies are comparable and moreover contain information on all mem-
bers of the needy household.  
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ployment benefit II (UB II) replaced the former means-test unemployment assistance 
(UA) and social assistance (SA) for needy people who are capable of working.3,4 
The reform did not generally cut benefit levels for needy households.5 The central 
idea behind introducing the Social Code II was to activate needy people, so that 
more of them are integrated into the labour market and their benefit dependency is 
reduced. This is of particular importance for people who without the reform would 
have received SA benefit as well as for people who would have been partners or 
other household members of a UA benefit recipient. Without the reform such people 
would not necessarily have been in contact with labour agencies, registered as un-
employed or as job-seekers nor would they have qualified for many types of active 
labour market policies. Due to the reform this has changed. Each member of a 
needy household, who is capable of working, is supposed to contribute to reducing 
the dependency on the means-tested benefit. 
The Social Code II demands efforts of unemployed persons with regard to job 
search and other activities to improve their chances of finding a job. Integration con-
tracts and benefit sanctions for those who do not comply to the rules are instru-
ments to raise such efforts. On the other hand, the reform provides more possibili-
ties of assisting unemployed persons towards employment take-up and in particular 
lead to more intensive active labour market policies.  
In order to provide financial incentives to UB II recipients to take-up regular jobs, 
together with the Social Code II the so called “Einstiegsgeld” programme (Article 29 
Social Code II) was introduced. The UB II agencies have the possibility to provide a 
temporary supplementary benefit to UB II recipients both for starting a contributory 
job as well as for starting-up their own business. According to Article 29 Social 
                                                
3  The old unemployment insurance (UI) benefit was labelled as unemployment benefit I. It 
is earnings-related with a replacement rate of 67 percent of the last net income for a par-
ent and 60 percent for childless people. The UI benefit in contrast to UB II is time-limited, 
where the length of receipt increases with the time a recipient has contributed to unem-
ployment insurance within a period of seven years prior to the benefit claim. The maxi-
mum duration of UI receipt though depends on age and was one year for those aged 
younger than 45 in the year 2005. It increased for older age groups and those older than 
56 years could even receive their UI benefit up to 32 months. The maximum UI entitle-
ment lengths of those older than 44 years though were considerably reduced in the year 
2006. 
4  People who are aged between 15 and 64 years and can work under the usual conditions 
of the labour market for at least three hours a day are regarded as capable of working. 
Only due to an illness or disability, it is possible not to fulfil this criterion (Article 8 Social 
Code II). 
5  Blos and Rudolph (2005) showed in a simulation study based on micro data from an in-
come and consumption survey how the benefit levels of former social assistance recipi-
ents and former unemployment assistance recipients were affected by the benefit reform. 
It did not much affect benefit levels of households of former social benefit recipients. 
However, about 17 percent of former unemployment assistance recipients no longer 
qualified for the new means-tested benefit. Of those former unemployment assistance 
households, which qualified for UB II, about 50 percent faced benefit reductions and 50 
percent a benefit increase.  
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Code II, the benefit can be paid for up 24 months. The level of the benefit should 
depend positively on the previous unemployment duration of the recipient as well as 
the size of the needy household. 
The Social Code does not explicitly regulate the implementation of the programme. 
It does not even state an upper cap for the Einstiegsgeld benefit. However, a man-
ual of the Federal Employment Agency (Federal Employment Agency, 2005) does 
specify how the UB II agencies are supposed to implement this discretionary pro-
gramme.6 It specifies the Einstiegsgeld benefit level in relation to the base UB II, 
which in the year of the introduction of the Social Code II was 345 Euro per month in 
West Germany and 331 Euro per month in East Germany.7 According to the manual 
the Einstiegsgeld benefit should amount to 50 percent of the base benefit plus ten 
percent of the base benefit for each additional member of the needy household. It 
should even be higher provided that the programme participant was unemployed for 
at least two years and/or is a person that for other reasons is hard to place. The 
base benefit level itself is the upper cap of the supplementary benefit.  
Whether these rules on the benefit level were implemented during the year 2005 is 
not entirely clear. Noll, Wolff and Nivorozhkin (2006) studied this question with ad-
ministrative micro data of the Einstiegsgeld participants and found some evidence 
for it. Nevertheless, their study remained largely inconclusive, since the data of this 
early period was characterised by more than 35 percent missing values for the level 
of the Einstiegsgeld subsidy. As this study also relies on these data, we cannot pro-
vide a more precise statement for the period under review. 
The manual of the Federal Employment Agency also recommends that the supple-
mentary Einstiegsgeld benefit should only be paid to UB II recipients who take up a 
contributory job of at least 15 working hours weekly or start-up a business as their 
main occupation. The objective behind that restriction is to promote only employ-
ment that leads the needy household out of benefit receipt. 
                                                
6  For a detailed description of the implementation of the programme in the year 2005 see 
Noll, Wolff, and Nivorozhkin (2006). 
7  These are the numbers for a lone adult or lone parent. The base benefit in East Germany 
was raised to the Western level in July 2006. On top of the base benefit there are addi-
tional elements in the unemployment benefit II formula: Needy households receive a 
benefit that covers the costs of accommodation and heating. Moreover, for former UI re-
cipients an additional benefit is paid during the first two years after exhausting UI. This 
additional benefit is related to the difference between the sum of the former UI and hous-
ing benefit receipt and the UB II benefit level. It amounts to two thirds of this difference in 
the first year after running out of UI receipt. However, there is an upper cap for the addi-
tional benefit of 160 Euro for singles and 320 Euro for partners. For each child that lives 
in the needy household of a person who is eligible for the additional benefit, the upper 
cap is raised by 60 Euro. In the second year after exhausting UI benefit receipt the addi-
tional benefit is cut by 50 percent. 
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The inflow into the Einstiegsgeld programme is relatively low. Table 1 presents the 
average unemployment stock of UB II recipients and the inflow into the programme 
over the period 2005 to 2007. The figures in Table 1 exclude 69 municipalities, 
which in contrast to most municipalities administer the UB II on their own and not 
together with the Federal Labour Agency. About 15 percent of needy unemployed 
people belong to these municipalties. The inflow into the self-employment scheme 
ranges from about 17 to more than 32 thousand per year. The number of pro-
gramme starts is even lower as far as we regard the Einstiegsgeld for starting con-
tributory employment. The annual average unemployment stock of UB II recipients 
instead amounts to about 2.2 to 2.4 million people. The number of programme starts 
is also quite low when we compare it to the largest programmes. One-Euro-Jobs, a 
workfare scheme for UB II recipients, is characterised by an annual inflow of 600 up 
to more than 700 thousand people and a short-term training programme by an an-
nual inflow of about 400 to 440 thousand. 
The low number of programme starts may have various reasons. One reason is that 
the programme was entirely new. For this reason the staff in the UB II agencies had 
no past experience with selecting potential participants and administering the pro-
gramme. That the inflow into the programme is particularly low in the year of its in-
troduction is in line with this hypothesis and suggests that the UB II agencies ex-
perimented with the programme prior to implementing it at larger scale. However, 
there are other reasons for the low inflow into the into the self-employment scheme. 
It may be that there is only a small number of needy unemployed who are actually 
likely to successfully start their own business. And credit constraints that would be 
binding for many poor households even concerning additional financial means of the 
start-up subsidy may also play an important role in explaining the low inflow. Finally, 
there may be a sorting effect: During UI receipt currently another start-up scheme 
and in the year 2005 even two such schemes were available to unemployed people. 
In contrast to Einstiegsgeld these subsidies have to be granted provided that the UI 
recipient can provide a solid business plan that is approved by a chamber of com-
merce.8 Therefore, there may be an incentive to apply for such a scheme prior to 
losing UI receipt and becoming needy. 
                                                
8  During the period that we analyse there were two start-up schemes for UI recipients: the 
“start-up subsidy” (Existenzgründungszuschuss) and the “bridging allowance’” (Über-
brückungsgeld). The start-up subsidy paid a benefit for three years. During the first year it 
was 600 Euro per month. The subsidy decreased to 360 Euro per month in the second 
and 240 Euro per month in the third year. The bridging allowance in contrast subsidized a 
start-up for a shorter period of time. The subsidy was paid for six months and is equal to 
the previously received unemployment benefit (plus a lump sum to cover social security 
contributions). Both programmes were characterised by a far larger inflow than the Ein-
stiegsgeld scheme, e.g., in the year 2005 the inflow into the bridging allowance amounted 
to 157 thousand people, while for the start-up subsidy the corresponding number was 91 
thousand people. For a detailed description of these programmes see Baumgartner and 
Caliendo (2007). They were merged to a new start-up subsidy labelled as 
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3 Literature Review 
The evaluation of treatment effects of start-up subsidies received a relatively limited 
attention in the economic literature. Recent international evidence includes studies 
conducted in the UK, New Zealand, Spain, and Germany. 
Meager et al. (2003) for the case of the UK conclude that the start-up programme 
offered to young males did not produce any visible effect. The comparison group 
was selected based on age, gender, region and employment status. Participation in 
the program did not increase earnings and reemployment potential compared to 
non-participation. 
The impact of participation in the half-year start-up programme in New Zealand is 
analysed by Perry (2006). The author adopts a difference-in-difference framework 
together with propensity score matching to analyse differences in the probability of 
re-registering with the public employment office two years after the programme start. 
The main conclusion of the author is that participants of the programme were less 
likely to re-register with the public employment office.  
The analysis of the business start-up schemes in Spain is limited to one region. 
Cueto and Mato (2006) analyse survival rates of the subsidised firms distinguishing 
between exits due to business failures and exits to contributory employment. The 
authors find that after five years the survival rate of subsidised firms is equal to 76%. 
The drawback of the study is that there is no control group and thus the study does 
not meet basic evaluation criteria. 
Besides the above mentioned studies there exists a rapidly growing area of busi-
ness start-up evaluations in Germany. Early research included studies by Pfeiffer 
and Reize (2000) and Reize (2004). Pfeiffer and Reize (2000) compare the survival 
probability of firms of unemployed people who started their business receiving a 
start-up subsidy with that of a control group of firms started by unemployed people 
who did not receive the subsidy by the public employment office. The authors con-
sider regional heterogeneity and thus conduct separate analyses for East and West 
Germany. The results of the study imply that subsidised firms in East Germany had 
lower chances of survival compared with unsubsidised ones. At the same time no 
significant relationship between subsidies and firm survival was found in West Ger-
many. Reize (2004) analyses transitions in and out of unemployment and concludes 
that comparing to other exits out of unemployment individuals who started their 
businesses after a period of unemployment had the lowest chance of registering 
with the employment office again.  
                                                                                                                                        
“Gründungszuschuss” by the mid of the year 2006. This new scheme pays as a start-up 
subsidy the UI benefit plus a lump sum of 300 Euro per month; the latter sum is intended 
to cover health insurance cost. The entitlement length of the subsidy is nine months. The 
receipt may be prolonged for another six months. 
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Recent results on the evaluation of the German start-up programmes for the unem-
ployed are presented in Baumgartner and Caliendo (2007). Two programmes were 
analysed: the start-up subsidy and the bridging allowance as described in section 
two. An important feature of both studies is that the authors use registry datasets 
combined with a follow-up survey. The information was collected for unemployed 
people who entered the business start-up programme in the third quarter of 2003 
and a group of eligible non-participants. Baumgartner and Caliendo (2007) adopt a 
propensity score matching estimator to estimate the earnings and employment ef-
fect. The results indicate that the programmes produce a significant and large gain 
in terms of earnings and the employment probability of the treated. The results are 
however heterogeneous, the effect is particularly pronounced for men. As a final 
part of the exercise the authors conduct a simple cost benefit analysis and conclude 
that both start-up programmes are effective and the bridging allowance also an effi-
cient policy tool. 
Caliendo and Kritikos (2007) look at the survival rates of the subsidised firms and 
find that the probability of the firm survival after 2.5 years after business founding is 
quite high, around 70%. At the same time the authors observe considerable hetero-
geneity in the characteristics of the entrepreneurs which influence their success. It 
should also be kept in mind that the results for the evaluation of the start-up subsidy 
are preliminary since the participants of this programme still receive the subsidy 2.5 
years after starting their business. 
The presented studies report considerable differences in the effect of the start-up 
schemes. A comparison of the results is complicated due to the different institutional 
set-up in different countries, different time periods and macroeconomic conditions. 
Our paper aims to extend the knowledge about the treatment effect of start-up 
schemes for the unemployed in Germany by regarding needy unemployed and a 
new start-up scheme that is only available to them. In the following section we will 
outline some theoretical considerations and present hypotheses of our study.  
4 Theoretical Considerations and Hypotheses 
Government interventions such as provision of start-up subsidies to the unemployed 
and social benefit recipients may be justified because of the existence of the market 
imperfections. Market imperfections may lead to the underinvestment problem, a 
situation in which viable businesses would not be funded. 
Poor unemployed people and hence especially recipients of the means-tested bene-
fits are usually credit constrained. If access to credit is limited but "bad" jobs are 
easy to come by, then job seekers may choose to get an undesirable job instead of 
opening a business (Browning et. al, 2007).  
Start-up subsidies are also important from the social point of view since the entre-
preneur values only its own private return and does not take into account public 
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benefits of new business creation, such as: creation of additional work places, de-
veloping entrepreneur culture in the country. 
Besides the desired effects of the business start-up schemes like enabling unem-
ployed people to become self-employed and integrating them more rapidly into the 
labour market, some adverse effects can occur. Among them is a deadweight loss 
and displacement effect. These effects can occur if start-up subsidies drive existing 
firms out of the market or prevent the start-up of unsubsidised firms. These effects 
are likely to be pronounced since it is likely that most of the businesses which are 
created with the assistance of the start-up subsidy are in the low cost service sector. 
Moreover, locking-in effects can arise, that reduce efforts made by unemployed per-
sons to search for alternative better jobs. While participating in the business start-up 
scheme, a person's search efforts decrease, e.g., because participation reduces the 
time available for job search. Furthermore participation can reduce the motivation to 
look for employment, because participants derive some subjective utility from pro-
gramme participation, e.g., due to carrying out a useful task. Job search efforts can 
already decline before participation started if the unemployed person knows about 
his participation in advance (“Ashenfelter’s Dip”). 
Thus, the actual effect of the start-up subsidy on the labour market performance of 
needy participants is not a priori clear. It has to be quantified by econometric re-
search. For a number of reasons there should be groups of unemployed people for 
which this particular programme is likely to be effective or ineffective. Let us discuss 
some specific hypotheses, which our analysis is going to address.  
A specific focus in our evaluation of the business start-up scheme is on the future 
employment and unemployment outcomes of the participants. We expect the pro-
portion of regular contributory employed programme participants to be relatively low, 
since the aim of the start-up subsidy is to reduce unemployment by promoting self-
employment. Hence, there are negative treatment effects on the outcome regular 
contributory employment. Moreover employers possibly do not regard start-up pro-
grammes as equivalent to regular employment or other forms of qualification (stigma 
effect). Creaming may be one of the reasons why beneficial effects of programme 
participation could be weak or absent and adverse locking-in and stigma effects 
dominate. This may be the case for groups of people with relatively good chances of 
finding a regular contributory job, e.g., people with high qualifications, people who 
are young or who only recently lost their jobs. 
Finally, the effects on avoiding benefit dependency, i.e., on the probability of “no 
UB II receipt” are a priori unclear. Given that non-participants have more time to 
search for a job, they may be choosier with respect to wage offers and achieve 
higher earnings in their jobs than the participants do with their start-up. Moreover, it 
is possible that only after a longer period of time the income of the entrepreneur will 
become high enough, such that he no longer passes the means-test, than for com-
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parable non-participants. In turn the effect of Einstiegsgeld on the probability of 
avoiding UB II receipt of the treated may be negative for quite some time after pro-
gramme start, while the effect in the long run is ambiguous. But it may be push-
factors that drive needy unemployed people to start their own business. I.e., there is 
an insufficient number of contributory job offers available to them and they are 
mainly low-wage and partly unstable jobs. In turn their start-up provides them with 
higher earnings than alternative jobs and we would expect the probability of “no 
UB II receipt” to be higher for the participants on the business start-up programme 
than for comparable non-participants. This should hold also after participants no 
longer receive their subsidy. In turn, we would also expect that treatment lowers the 
proportion of registered job-seekers among participants. 
5 Methods and Data 
5.1 Methods 
When evaluating the programme effects of Einstiegsgeld, the problem of unobserv-
able possible outcomes arises. This is the fundamental evaluation problem. The 
Roy (1951)-Rubin (1974)-Model gives a standard framework for this problem. The 
model and the matching method which under certain assumptions resolves the 
evaluation problem are discussed in many recent papers, e.g. Caliendo and 
Kopeinig (2006) or Sianesi (2004). The main pillars in the model are first individuals, 
second the treatment and third potential outcomes. 
Every individual can potentially be in two states (treatment/no treatment) each with a 
possibly different outcome. As no individual can be observed in both of these two 
states at the same time, there is always a non-observed state, which is called the 
counterfactual. 
Let D be an indicator for treatment, which takes the value one if a person is treated 
and zero otherwise. The treatment effect ATTτ  for a treated individual would be the 
difference of his outcome with treatment ( )1(iY ) and without the treatment ( )0(iY ):  
]1)0([]1)1([]1)0()1([ =−===−= iiiiiiiATT DYEDYEDYYEτ     (1) 
The outcome of an individual can never be observed in the treatment and the non-
treatment state at the same time, so that the causal effect in equation (1) is unob-
servable. This identification problem needs to be resolved. Under certain assump-
tions a comparison of the outcomes of treatment group members with very similar 
control individuals identify the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).9 
                                                
9  The decision on which effect to estimate depends on the research question. Heckman, 
LaLonde and Smith (1999) discuss further parameters. 
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Propensity Score Matching is one approach to identify such effects. We follow the 
discussion of the approach by Becker and Ichino (2002): Let us define the propen-
sity score according to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) as the conditional probability 
of treatment, where iX  is a vector of observables at values prior to treatment. 
]1[]1[)( iiiii XDEXDPXP ====  ,       (2) 
In this context some conditions have to hold for identifying the treatment effect: the 
condition of balancing of pre-treatment variables given the propensity score 
( )(XPXD ⊥ ). According to this condition observations with the same propensity 
score have the same distribution of observables; given pre-treatment characteris-
tics, treatment is random and treatments and control units do on average not differ 
with respect to pre-treatment characteristics. Next, there are the conditions of un-
confoundedness ( XDYY ⊥)0(),1( ) and of unconfoundedness given the propensity 
score ( )()0(),1( XPDYY ⊥ ). Unconfoundedness is also labelled as the conditional 
independence assumption (CIA) and states that outcomes in case of treatment and 
non-treatment are independent from actual assignment to treatment given the pro-
pensity score. 
If treatment is random within cells defined by the vector X , it is also random within 
such cells defined by the values of propensity score )(XP , which in contrast to X  
has only one dimension. Given the above conditions, we have 
{ }
{ }1|)](,0|)0([)](,1|)1([
)](,1|)0()1([
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==−==
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   (3) 
The basic idea of the matching estimator is to substitute the unobservable expected 
outcome without treatment of the treated )](,1)0([ iii XPDYE =  by an observable 
expected outcome of a suitable control group [ ])(,0)0( iii XPDYE =  that has the 
same distribution of the propensity score as the treatment group. To implement a 
matching estimator, it requires the additional assumption of common support 
1)1(0 <=< XDP ,          (4) 
since for individuals whose probability of treatment is either 0 or 1, no counterfactual 
can be found. Finally, the "stable unit treatment value assumption" (SUTVA) has to 
be made. It states that the individual's potential outcome only depends on his own 
participation and not on the treatment status of other individuals. It implies that there 
are neither general equilibrium nor cross-person effects. 
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We estimate the ATT at different points in time after programme start (t=0):  
}1|)](,0|)0([{)](,1|)1([ 0,0,0,,0,0,,, ==−== iiitiiititATT DXPDYEEXPDYEτ    (5) 
As propensity score matching estimators we use nearest neighbour and radius 
matching imposing common support. Both techniques select for each treatment ob-
servation one or more comparison individuals from a potential control group. The 
following equation defines these estimators:10 
∑ ∑
∈ ∈
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⋅−=
treatedi controlsj
jiji
treated
ATT YwYN
)0()1(1τ ,     (6) 
where treatedN  is the number of treated persons. ijw  is a weight defined as 
controlsi
ij N
w
,
1
=  ,          (7) 
where controlsiN ,  represents the number of controls matched to the i
th treated person. 
With nearest neighbour matching, this number is chosen by the researcher: e.g., for 
each treated individual from the control group five neighbours are chosen whose 
propensity score differs less from that of the treated individual than those of all other 
control group members. In case of radius matching, all control group individuals are 
chosen whose propensity score does not differ in absolute terms from the one of the 
treatment individual by more than a given distance. In that case the number of 
matched controls may differ for each treatment individual. For the analytical vari-
ances and hence the standard errors of these estimators see Becker and Ichino 
(2002). When carrying out the analysis we followed the outline from Caliendo and 
Kopeinig (2006). 
5.2 Data 
For the CIA to hold good data are important. It is not enough to think about good 
estimators (Heckman et al., 1998) but a data source that is rich in terms of informa-
tion on individual characteristics and in particular on their programme participation 
and other labour market outcomes is essential. Characteristics on the individual’s 
household are an important addition to such information. The data in use are admin-
istrative data of the German Federal Employment Agency that were prepared for 
scientific use at the Institute for Employment Research and contain the mentioned 
information on a daily basis. We use samples of the "Integrated Employment Biog-
                                                
10  For simplicity we leave away the subscript t for time after programme start. 
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raphies" (IEB).11 Individual information about employment and unemployment his-
tory, daily earnings, occupation, education, and active labour market programme 
history is available in these data. We additionally rely on an official job-seeker data 
base (“Bewerberangebotsdatei”) that provides information on socio-demographic 
characteristics.12  
Many evaluation studies of active labour market programmes rely on administrative 
data. In contrast to most of these studies, we have the information just described not 
only for the persons of the treatment and control group but also for members of their 
needy household. This information is available since the benefit reform of the year 
2005, as a new way of registering members of means-tested households was intro-
duced. As a consequence, a new data set, the “Unemployment Benefit II Receipt 
History”, is available, which contains spells of means-tested benefit receipt of all 
members of a needy household together with a household identifier. Hence, our set 
of covariates that potentially determines the propensity score is a lot richer than that 
of many other comparable studies. This is particularly important to justify the Condi-
tional Independence Assumption. 
For the treatment group we use the total inflow into Einstiegsgeld for start-ups from 
February to April 2005 of persons who were both registered unemployed and ‘un-
employment benefit II’ recipients at the end of January 2005. We only consider un-
employed persons aged 20 to 57 years, since older UB II recipients do nearly never 
enter the programme. The potential controls stem from a 20 percent random sample 
of UB II recipients who were unemployed at 31st January 2005 and who did not en-
ter the self-employment programme from February to April 2005. We carried out the 
analysis using the entire control group sample. Given the small number of partici-
pants, there is however a number of local UB II agencies to which none of the per-
sons in the treatment sample belong. Therefore, we also used a restricted control 
group sample which a priori excludes 139 out of 487 such units in the data. We fur-
ther restricted the control group sample only to people who live in the same places 
of residence as the treated individuals so that out of more than five thousand differ-
ent small scale areas where the sample members live only 540 were represented by 
the data. All results that we discuss in the next section select matched controls from 
the restricted sample. 
For the control group members naturally no programme start is available over this 
period in which treatment started. Therefore, we computed a random programme 
start for the controls such that it follows the distribution of programme starts of the 
                                                
11  The samples exclude the 69 districts in which only local authorities are in charge of ad-
ministering the unemployment benefit II. For them systematic information on programme 
participation is not available. 
12  In particular it allows to compute covariates on family status, children, migration back-
ground and health status with information from this data base. 
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treatment group over these months and excluded those controls from our analyses 
who exited from unemployment before the calculated random programme start.13,14  
The data on the outcomes was constructed from two data sources. We used infor-
mation on whether people are registered as unemployed or as job-seekers or are 
employed in a contributory job from an additional register data set, the “Verbleibs-
nachweise”. These administrative data have one great advantage over the IEB (ver-
sion 6.00), which also contains such information. They provide the information for a 
more recent past. This is important since we deal with a relatively recent treatment 
and need to observe outcomes for a sufficiently long period of time after treatment. 
We can hence regard the outcome unsubsidised contributory employment for 20 
months instead of only eight months. The “Verbleibsnachweise” also allow an ob-
servation window of 25 months after programme start for the outcome variables “not 
registered as unemployed” and “neither registered as unemployed nor as job-
seeker” which is five months longer than that of the IEB. 
The information on the third outcome variable “unemployment benefit receipt” stems 
from another data set, the “Unemployment Benefit II Receipt History” (Leistungs-
historik Grundsicherung) and is available for 24 months after programme start. The 
sample sizes of treatments and controls are displayed in Table 2. There are more 
than 1,200 treatments and more than 270,000 potential controls. For the different 
subsamples for which the treatment effects were estimated, there are at least 263 
treated (women) and up to a maximum of 944 treated (men). 
6 Estimation Results 
6.1 Implementation 
We estimated the ATTs for different groups of participants in order to identify effect 
heterogeneity. Our main interest is in four groups: men and women, East and West 
Germany. We also study whether the treatment effect of the start-up subsidy varies 
with other characteristics of the participants: We regard relatively young UB II re-
                                                
13  When computing the random programme start, we took into account differences of the 
distribution of programme starts between East and West Germany. If between 31st of 
January 2005 and their (computed or true) programme start control or treatment group 
members already exited from unemployment (e.g., due to some other programme partici-
pation), they were dismissed from our samples. 
14  The data collected by the UB II agencies at the beginning of the year 2005 is certainly 
characterised by some measurement error. This is not surprising, given that more than 
three million needy households with more than six million benefit recipients had to be reg-
istered according to the new system. In particular, a new software, “A2ll”, was introduced 
to register basic information on benefits and other traits of the needy households and 
their members. Not all UB II agencies provided complete information at the beginning of 
the year 2005 with this software according to the Statistical Department of the Federal 
Employment Agency. Therefore to some extent the daily information is not precise. Dates 
of individual events like the start or end of benefit receipt may not always have been re-
ported or do not precisely reflect the true dates. 
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cipients (25-45 years) and German versus foreign UB II recipients. Next, we distin-
guish between people who are single or live with a partner, and people who were 
either never employed in a contributory job or whose last contributory employment 
ended more than 32 months ago and people whose last job ended during the last 32 
months. The sample sizes of treatments and potential controls of these subsamples 
are displayed in Table 2.  
We investigate the effects of participation in the start-up programme on four different 
outcome variables at different points in time after programme start to have a com-
prehensive insight into the effects of the programme.  
First, we investigate the effect of participation on the probability of being regularly 
employed (i.e. unsubsidised contributory employment). The effects on this outcome 
provide an idea of the extent to which the treatment by the start-up subsidy lowers 
the probability of working in a contributory job at different points in time. It is of 
course not our key outcome variable, since the start-up subsidy aims at successfully 
integrating the treated into self-employment. Nevertheless, there is a valid question 
that we want to answer: Does treatment by the start-up programme reduce consid-
erably the chances of being employed in unsubsidised contributory jobs? 
As an indicator of the success of the programme a second outcome variable is of 
much more importance. We observe whether the persons in our sample are regis-
tered as unemployed or registered as a job seeker. The second outcome compared 
to the first includes participation in active labour market programmes as participants 
are registered as a job seeker in the majority of cases. Thus, a person who is nei-
ther registered as unemployed nor as job-seeking can be a) regularly employed with 
a working time of a least 15 hours a week, for more than three months and earns 
sufficiently to live on or b) has no longer registered as unemployed or job-seeking 
without working. Hence, this outcome variable by and large can be interpreted as an 
indicator for either being employed in a regular and rather stable job (both contribu-
tory employment and self-employment) or being out of the labour force. 
Third, we present some results on the size of the treatment effect on the outcome 
“not registered as unemployed”. People who participate in active labour market pro-
grammes or who are temporarily employed for very short periods of time would not 
be registered as unemployed, but usually are registered as job-seekers. 
Finally, we observe whether the household of the person and hence the person re-
ceives UB II. If the household no longer receives UB II at some point in time, it may 
be due to the household being no longer needy or it stopped applying for benefits. 
For the first of these two possibilities there can be several reasons: the person in 
our sample or other members in the person’s household start to achieve sufficient 
earnings both by subsidised and unsubsidised employment, such that the house-
hold no longer passes the means-test. Various changes in the household composi-
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tion may also lead to such a result. E.g., a person in our sample moves to another 
household with other income that is sufficiently high. Such changes may be affected 
by treatment. E.g., due to the start-up subsidy for one member of the household and 
an expected success of the start-up that implies additional financial means, other 
household members may less intensively search for jobs or are less likely to set-up 
their own household.  
For each of the analysed groups we estimated one probit model for the probability to 
participate in the start-up programme. The covariate sets in these analyses contain 
personal characteristics (age, nationality, health indicators, whether the person is 
single, number of children and qualification), labour market history (indicators on 
unemployment, and regular employment periods in the past, past participation in 
active labour market programmes, characteristics of the last contributory job), char-
acteristics of the partner (labour market history and qualification) and finally regional 
characteristics (dummy variables reflecting a classification of the labour market 
situation developed by Rüb and Werner (2007) and some further controls at district 
level: unemployment rate, share of long-term-unemployment in the unemployment 
pool, ratio between the vacancy and the unemployment stock in January 2005). 
These characteristics should make it likely that the treatment and control outcomes 
given the propensity scores differ only due to treatment and hence that the uncon-
foundedness condition holds.  
In particular partner characteristics are new in this context, as administrative data 
are usually weak on such information. Partner characteristics play a role for the em-
ployment decisions but also for outcomes like “no receipt of UB II”, e.g., a UB II re-
cipient with a high in contrast to a low skilled partner is more likely to exit from UB II, 
when the partner finds a job. 
The probit models that we estimated rely on the described set of covariates. Never-
theless, the exact specification of covariate sets differs over the sub-groups. This is 
first of all because the lower the sample sizes, the broader some variables (e.g., 
dummy variables for age groups) have to be defined. In Table 3 and Table 4 we 
present the coefficients of the four probit models that distinguish between men and 
women and between East and West Germany. The coefficients of probit models for 
other subgroups are not presented in this paper; they are available on request. 
6.2 Sensitivity Analyses and Match Quality 
Rosenbaum Bounds 
Our results are based on the assumption of unconfoundedness. If there are any 
unobserved variables that influence selection into the programme as well as out-
come variables of the programme a hidden bias could occur and matching estima-
tors would not be robust. The basic idea behind Rosenbaum Bounds is that the 
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odds ratio of treatment of two matched individuals is one, given that they are charac-
terised by the same observables.15 If there are neglected unobserved factors that 
influence the participation probabilities though, these odds of treatment could 
change, e.g., to a value two. With the help of Rosenbaum bounds we can conduct 
an analysis that determines how sensitive our results are to the influence of an un-
observed variable. It shows how strong neglected unobserved factors have to 
change the odds ratio, so that we overestimate or underestimate the treatment ef-
fect. 
We computed the Mantel-Haentzel statistic using the Stata Programme “mhbounds” 
by Becker and Caliendo (2007). We calculated the test statistic QMH for the each of 
the outcomes in every observed month after programme start for each sample we 
considered. Here we discuss only results on the bounds of the two most important 
outcome variables “neither registered as unemployed nor as a job-seeker” and “no 
UB II receipt”. These are the bounds for nearest neighbour matching with one 
neighbour and without replacement, as the mhbounds command can only be ap-
plied for nearest neighbour matching without replacement or for stratification match-
ing (Becker and Caliendo 2007).  
We discuss the results of this sensitivity analysis only for the sample of men and 
women and East and West Germans. The effects on the selected outcomes are 
positive, substantial and significant, as we will later discuss in detail. Let us first re-
gard the bounds or the outcome “neither registered as unemployed nor as a job-
seeker”. We find unobserved factors that lead to odds ratios of 1.6 to 1.7 would be 
sufficient to turn the results of women as well as of East and West Germans into an 
insignificant one at 24 months after programme start. For men the corresponding 
factor is two. And for the outcome “no UB II receipt” 24 months after programme 
start the corresponding numbers are slightly lower ranging from 1.4 to 1.9. Hence 
most of the results are relatively robust to such unobserved factors. 
The results of the sensitivity analysis do not mean that a bias actually exists but that 
matching results are sensitive to possible deviations from the assumption of uncon-
foundedness and thus one has to be careful in interpreting the results. 
Common support 
Furthermore for propensity score matching we have to assume that there is a com-
mon support which means that the propensity score should lie between zero and 
one and that the distributions of the propensity score are similar for treatment and 
control groups. The propensity score is displayed for the samples of men and 
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 IAB-Discussion Paper 20/2008 21 
women and of East and West Germany in Figure 1 and in Figure 2. The distribution 
of the score differs considerably between treatments and controls. Nevertheless, 
there is no interval of the propensity score of the treatments for which we cannot 
find control individuals, which is sufficient to find adequate matches for the treated. 
Sensitivity to choice of the matching method 
For the four main groups (East and West Germany, men and women) we estimated 
the ATT using different matching estimators, nearest neighbour one-to-one match-
ing without replacement and nearest neighbour matching with replacement using 
five neighbours. First, each estimation was carried out without caliper. We estimated 
the 90th and 99th percentile of the differences between the propensity score of treat-
ments and controls (in absolute terms) in each application. These percentiles were 
then used as 1st and 2nd caliper leaving out the worst one and ten percent of 
matched pairs. We checked for differences in the estimated ATTs 12, 20 and 24 
months after programme start. This analysis confirmed that our estimation results 
are quite stable over the different methods regarding our samples of East and West 
Germans as well as men and women. In most cases there is a negligible difference 
between the estimated ATTs achieved with different matching estimators. And all of 
them are within the 95 percent confidence band of the estimated ATTs that result 
from nearest neighbour estimator with five neighbours and with replacement. This is 
valid for all outcomes considered. We present only results based on this latter esti-
mator. 
Balancing 
As we do not condition on all covariates but on the propensity score, we have to 
check the balancing of the relevant variables. Therefore we applied several meas-
ures that give us information on the balancing. The standardised absolute bias 
measures the distance in the marginal distribution of the covariates. Table 5 dis-
plays the standard absolute bias as an average over all covariates. Before match-
ing, the biases for the different groups that we consider range from roughly 10 to 15 
percent. After we implement matching the bias does not exceed 2.7 percent and for 
most subgroups it is even below two percent. 
Besides the standardised bias for all covariates we checked the matching quality for 
single covariates. Tables 6-9 display the mean of the covariates for treatments, all 
controls and matched controls for men and women and for East and West Germany. 
Furthermore, the p-values of a t-test on the hypothesis that the mean of a given co-
variate is the same for the control and the treatment group are displayed for all co-
variates. The results demonstrate that after matching there are no significant differ-
ences between treatment and control group in any of the variables.16 
                                                
16  The results for the other samples for which we estimated ATTs are available on request. 
 IAB-Discussion Paper 20/2008 22 
6.3 Average Treatment Effects on the Treated 
The estimated ATTs for the samples of men and women and East and West Ger-
mans are presented in Figure 3 and Figure 4 and Table 10. We present the results 
for the four outcomes regular employment, neither registered as unemployed nor as 
a job-seeker, not registered as unemployed and no UB II receipt. The results stem 
from nearest neighbour matching with replacement which matches five individuals 
from the control group to a treated individual. Standard errors were computed with 
Stata bootstrap procedure 200 replications. Note though Abadie and Imbens (2006) 
showed that in nearest neighbourhood matching applications bootstrap standard 
errors are not valid in general.  
For judging the treatment effects it is important to keep in mind that the maximum 
duration of the program is equal to 24 months and thus some of the programme 
participants are still receiving state support at the end of our observation window. 
Nevertheless, the actual spell lengths of the start-up subsidy in our sample are fre-
quently far below the maximum. The median duration is about seven months and 
after roughly 18 months 95 percent of the treated no longer receive the start-up 
subsidy. Hence, in the last months of our observation window only a very small 
share of the treated still participate in the programme. 
Let us first discuss briefly the treatment effects on the outcome regular contributory 
employment. Of course the treatment effect on this outcome is negative over the 
entire observation period as displayed by Figure 3 and Figure 4; the primary aim of 
the Einstiegsgeld start-up scheme is to increase the participants’ probability of being 
self-employed and not contributory employed. If we were to observe a large share of 
programme participants in unsubsidised contributory employment, this would be 
unlikely to lead us to the conclusion of a positive effect of participation of the busi-
ness start-up scheme. 20 months after programme start, the proportion of the 
treated in contributory employment is roughly between nine and 11 percentage 
points lower than for the matched controls. The result is a bit stronger (more nega-
tive) for males and West Germans than for women and East Germans. The differ-
ence between West and East Germany is not surprising. It is due to the far better 
performance of the West as opposed to the East German labour market, which im-
plies higher job finding rates for the West German matched controls.17 Small gender 
differences may be explained by the different attitudes to risk taking of males and 
females. If females are more risk averse they are likely to switch from self-
employment into contributory employment. But the effect could also be explained 
due to better labour market prospects of the male as compared with the female con-
                                                
17  During our observation period, which includes mainly the years 2005 and 2006, the un-
employment rate in West Germany was between nine and 10 percent. In East Germany 
instead it ranged from about 17 to 19 percent (Source: Statistics Department of the Fed-
eral Labour Agency). These numbers refer to registered unemployment. 
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trols. We also observe that the effect tends to become stronger (more negative) as 
time passes for most of the groups. 
Regarding the three other outcome variables all treatment effects are positive. This 
however is partly linked to the design of the evaluated programme.  
Now turn to the treatment effects on the outcomes “neither registered as unem-
ployed nor as a job-seeker” and “not registered as unemployed” of programme par-
ticipants compared with non-participants. In the first few months after programme 
start we observe a large positive effect for the outcome “not registered as unem-
ployed” lying at around 60 to 70 percentage points, irrespective of gender and re-
gion (see Figure 3 and Figure 4). The estimated ATT for the outcome “neither regis-
tered as unemployed nor as a job-seeker” is lower but still above 30 percentage 
points. Interpreting these results in the first months one should be cautious. Positive 
values in these months do not indicate a success as the analysed programme is 
long and thus participants are not registered as unemployed due to their active la-
bour market programme (ALMP) participation. 
Generally the trends for the effects reviewed above are non-monotonic but decline 
in the long run. By the 20th month the estimated ATT on the outcome “not registered 
as unemployed” is about 25 to 30 percentage points for most of the different partici-
pant groups as displayed in Table 10. The corresponding effect on “neither regis-
tered as unemployed nor as a job-seeker” is roughly 20 percentage points. Hence, 
whether we regard men or women, East or West Germans, Germans or Foreigners 
the order of magnitude of the treatment effect is quite similar for this latter outcome. 
Again one should keep in mind that for the bulk of participants of the start-up 
scheme the subsidy has already terminated before the 20th month after programme 
start.  
When we regard the outcome “not registered as unemployed” the estimated ATTs 
differ more between some treatment groups. For the main analysed groups we ob-
serve that the effect is slightly weaker for female participants compared to male par-
ticipants 20 months after programme start (Table 10). For East Germans it is about 
five percentage points lower than for West Germans. As by that point in time nearly 
none of the participants still receives the subsidy, we conclude that due to the better 
labour market situation in the West, the start-ups also are more successful than in 
the East. However, the differences between the ATTs of East and West Germany 
are not statistically significant as the 95 percent confidence bands in Figure 4 dem-
onstrate. 
As a final and crucial part of our evaluation exercise we present the estimated ATTs 
for the outcome “not receiving UB II”. The results support our previous conclusion 
that there is evidence pointing to a significant positive effect of participation in the 
business start-up programme compared to non-participation. At the beginning of the 
evaluation period we observe that the ATT of “not receiving UB II” is approximately 
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zero for all groups of participants. This is displayed for the samples of men and 
women and East and West Germany in Figure 3 and Figure 4. Hence, during the 
first few months of the start-up the share of participants who are not needy is hardly 
changed by the subsidy. Yet, slowly treatment raises this share. By the end of our 
observations window, 20 months up to 25 months after programme start, the share 
of participants who do not receive UB II is considerably higher than that of the 
matched controls. When we regard men or West Germans, the difference between 
treated and matched controls is more than 15 percentage points (see Table 10). For 
women and East Germans the corresponding number is 11 percentage points. Our 
findings indicate that due to participation some participants of the Einstiegsgeld 
start-up scheme become self-reliant relatively fast and do not require financial sup-
port in terms of UB II. These results together with the ones for the outcome “neither 
registered as unemployed nor as a job-seeker” clearly suggest that the start-up sub-
sidy is effective in terms of integrating a considerable share of participants into the 
labour market and in turn reducing their benefit dependency. 
So far we have learned that participation in the Einstiegsgeld start-up scheme pro-
duces significant gains both for West and East German participants as well as for 
male and female participants. In the analysis however we consider a number of 
other socio-demographic groups (see Table 10). These are the 25 to 45 year olds, 
people with secondary or higher education, Germans versus foreigners and people 
who worked in unsubsidised contributory employment in the last 32 months com-
pared with those who did not fulfil this criterion. The estimated ATTs for the different 
outcomes are relatively similar in order of magnitude among these different treat-
ment groups (Table 10). Thus, we do not observe much effect heterogeneity. At the 
same time it is important to keep in mind that the sample which was available for the 
analysis is quite small and does not allow us to conduct a more detailed analysis 
with more homogeneous groups. An analysis involving more participants of the pro-
gramme that allows studying effect heterogeneity in more detail and over a longer 
period of time is a topic for further research. 
7 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper estimated the treatment effects on treated of a new start-up subsidy, 
”Einstiegsgeld” for needy unemployed people in Germany. The start-up subsidy was 
introduced together with a new means-tested benefit system at the start of the year 
2005. It is paid on top of the means-tested benefit, provided that the household re-
mains needy. We analysed for a sample of needy unemployed people, who entered 
the programme from February to April 2005, whether the participation improved their 
labour market performance and lead them out of means-tested benefit receipt. The 
data stem from different administrative records, which do not provide any informa-
tion about unsubsidised self-employment. Therefore, we studied in particular 
whether the programme made it more likely for participants not to receive UB II, or 
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neither to be registered as unemployed nor as job-seekers. Positive values of these 
indicators point to a successful participation. 
Our results from nearest neighbour matching with replacement and five neighbours 
imply that the programme is effective. By the end of our observation window, about 
two years after programme start, the estimated ATTs suggest that treatment raised 
the share of participants who do not receive UB II and who are registered neither as 
unemployed nor as job-seekers. For the first of these two outcomes the effect is, 
depending on the sample, of an order of magnitude of about 11 to 16 percentage 
points, while for the second it is roughly 20 percentage points. Our results do not 
point to large differences between the ATTs of different groups of participants. How-
ever, East Germans and women tend to benefit less from the start-up subsidy than 
West Germans and males as far as we are concerned with the treatment effect on 
the dependency on means-tested benefits. That the treatment effect is lower in the 
East than the West is hardly surprising. Since the East German economy is still less 
prosperous than the West German one, the success rate of the start-ups tends to be 
higher in the West. 
Baumgartner and Caliendo (2007) estimated in a similar study the ATTs of two start-
up programmes, which were not focused on needy people but rather on unemploy-
ment insurance benefit recipients. The results of one or their outcome variables “not 
unemployed” can be compared to ours; the treatment effects on the treated are of a 
similar order of magnitude for the Einstiegsgeld start-up scheme that we analysed 
and the bridging allowance and the other start-up subsidy that they analysed. 
Baumgartner and Caliendo (2007) also had data on another outcome “Employed or 
Self-Employed” from a survey that was conducted with the treated and controls and 
found that both programmes had raised the share of employed people for the par-
ticipant considerably. Even though we do not have such information, the similarities 
of the treatment effects on the unemployment outcome may well imply similarities 
for such an employment outcome. 
The start-up scheme is effective for needy unemployed participants and hence 
achieves the goal of raising their chance to escape from UB II receipt. The pro-
gramme is small in terms of inflow, with less than 20 thousand new participants in 
the year 2005 and around 30 thousand participants in 2006 and 2007. Hence, one 
policy implication is that promoting more start-ups by Einstiegsgeld is a successful 
strategy for reducing benefit dependency. However, it is not clear, whether the num-
ber of participants can be increased considerably. First of all the number of potential 
entrepreneurs among needy unemployed people may be small. In contrast to UI 
benefit recipients they are on average people who are harder to place. Hence the 
share of people with the hard and soft skills for starting their own business is most 
likely lower among UB II recipients than among UI recipients. Credit constraints for 
poor households may be the reason for the low inflow into the programme and 
hence the level of the subsidy would have to increase in order to raise the number 
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of treated. However, there may also be a sorting effect that explains that the number 
of subsidised start-ups is low among the needy unemployed. Potential entrepre-
neurs presumably enter a start-up programme as long as they receive UI benefit. 
Before running out of UI, they have the right to enter such a scheme, provided that 
their business plan was externally approved by a chamber of commerce. This is 
different with the Einstiegsgeld scheme. Even providing such a business plan does 
not guarantee the receipt of the start-up subsidy. It has to be approved by the UB II 
agency. 
Until now there is only little evidence on which ALMPs effectively achieve the goal of 
activating needy unemployed people in Germany. The One-Euro-Job, a work-fare 
programme, and the assignment to a private placement service apparently achieve 
smaller treatment effects on the treated than the start-up subsidy. A comparison of 
our results to the studies of Hohmeyer and Wolff (2007) and Bernhard and Wolff 
(2008) demonstrates this. Evaluation results on short-term training programmes 
(Wolff and Jozwiak, 2007) for the benefit dependency outcome as far as training 
takes place within companies are of a similar order of magnitude as the start-up 
subsidy for the treated (Wolff and Jozwiak, 2007). Though this statement holds only, 
if we regard the end of our observation window of around two years after pro-
gramme start. Earlier on the training programme is more effective for its treated. 
However, this comparison cannot tell us which program works better for which 
treatment group. The treatment groups of each of these programmes differ both in 
composition and size. Further research should hence analyse whether the Ein-
stiegsgeld as a start-up scheme is more effective in terms of reducing benefit de-
pendency and integration into the labour market for its specific participants than 
other programmes. 
Future research should also shed light on additional issues. Our observation window 
was still short. Thus, additional research has to analyse whether the Einstiegsgeld 
start-up scheme reduces the need for means-tested benefits in the long-term. More-
over, at later points in time one can draw on larger inflow samples into the start-up 
programme. Hence, it is possible to take into account more effect heterogeneity. 
Another topic is the effectiveness of the programme on a macro-level. From our re-
sults, we cannot infer whether the intensity of the programme reduces the job-
seeker rate and rate of needy unemployed or raises the employment rate in the 
economy. We cannot assume that there is for example no deadweight loss. Whether 
the programme is effective for the entire economy can be studied with dynamic 
panel data models using district level panel data.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
Average stock of needy unemployed and inflow into the Einstiegsgeld programme 
in thousand1),2) 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007
Total 2402.0 2442.8 2187.0 17.1 32.6 30.1 2.9 14.9 19.2
(Share of women in %) (44.2) (45.2) (47.0) (29.8) (31.6) (33.9) (47.1) (38.9) (40.4)
East Germany 834.0 846.8 781.0 6.0 13.1 14.0 2.2 9.6 8.5
(Share of women in %) (45.2) (44.9) (46.0) (33.2) (33.7) (34.9) (49.8) (43.6) (49.1)
West Germany 1568.0 1596.0 1406.1 11.2 19.4 16.1 0.7 5.3 10.7
(Share of women in %) (43.7) (45.4) (47.5) (28.0) (30.2) (33.1) (38.5) (30.4) (33.6)
Average stock of Inflow into Einstiegsgeld programme
needy unemployed start-up scheme contributory empl. scheme
 
Source: Data Warehouse of the Statistics Department of the Federal Labour Agency 
1)  The data on the year 2007 are preliminary. 
2)  The data exclude 69 districts in which only local authorities are in charge of administering the unemployment 
benefit II. They did not provide systematic information on programme participation in the period under review. 
 
 
Table 2 
Sample sizes of treated and potential controls 
Treated Controls
Total Sample 1,207 273,232
East Germany 434 93,114
West Germany 773 133,635
Male 944 129,311
Female 263 97,438
Age 25-45 858 128,677
Education: Secondary or  Higher 757 117,422
German 873 186,556
Foreign 334 40,193
Time since end of last regular job is more than 32 
months or never regularly employed 623 147,630
Time since end of last regular job is less or equal to 32 
months 584 79,119  
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Table 3 
Probit coefficients of start-up scheme participation equation by gender 
Male Female
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Age in years
20 to 25 0.202** 0.069 0.19 0.128
26 to 35 0.301** 0.055 0.306** 0.112
36 to 45 0.225** 0.054 0.300** 0.109
46 to 55 0.140** 0.055 0.208* 0.11
56 to 62 ref. ref.
Number of children
No child ref. ref.
One child 0.102** 0.032 -0.043 0.048
Two children or more 0.097** 0.032 0.06 0.052
Health limitation (1 = yes) -0.239** 0.027 -0.098* 0.053
Nationality: German -0.027 0.052 0.011 0.084
Couple household 0.042 0.033 -0.014 0.068
Education
No degree ref. ref.
Secondary or higher school degree 0.042 0.033 -0.014 0.068
Secondary school degree with apprenticeship 0.087** 0.035 0.218** 0.07
Higher education 0.188** 0.035 0.373** 0.065
Partner Education
No degree 0.002 0.061
Secondary or higher school degree -0.012 0.059
Secondary school degree with apprenticeship -0.044 0.073
Higher education ref.
missing 1: no IEB information on partner 0.005 0.065
missing 2: partner education missing in IEB 0.02 0.058
No degree or secondary or higher school degree -0.212** 0.087
Secondary school degree with apprenticeship -0.086 0.09
Higher education ref.
Missing or no info /IEB info but no part. educ. -0.181* 0.096
Partner cumulated unempl. duration in last five years
less than 181 days 0.074 0.046
181 to 360 days 0.088 0.059
more than 360 days ref. ref.
less than 361 days 0.066 0.078
Partner cumulated employment duration during last 
five years
Partner no empl. spell ref. ref.
less than 361 days 0.044 0.052
more than 360 days 0.003 0.042
at least one day 0.089 0.066  
* 10% sign. level,  ** 5% sign. level, *** 1% sign. level 
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Table 3 continued 
Probit coefficients of start-up scheme participation equation by gender1) 
Male Female
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Cumulated employment duration during last five years
No employment spell -0.071 0.079 -0.031 0.125
less than 181 days ref. ref.
181 to 360 days 0.008 0.04 0.015 0.08
more than 360 days -0.074** 0.036 -0.042 0.069
Want to work full-time 0.066 0.085 0.022 0.047
Last professional status
No regular employment ever 0.005 0.064 0.201* 0.115
Unskilled worker ref. ref.
Skilled-worker 0.045 0.03 0.115 0.08
White-collar 0.219** 0.033 0.1 0.062
Non-classified 0.027 0.042 0.079 0.063
Last monthly real wage (deflated with CPI, 2000=100)
0 Euro <= last salary  < 400 Euro ref. ref.
400 Euro <= last salary <  1000 Euro -0.057 0.064 -0.109 0.097
1000 Euro <= last salary < 1500 Euro -0.059 0.063 -0.072 0.099
last salary >= 1500 Euro -0.047 0.062 0.063 0.101
Time since end of last contributory employment 
< 18 months ref. ref.
18 to 32 months 0.025 0.031 -0.019 0.06
33 to 45 months -0.018 0.038 -0.172** 0.079
more than 45 months 0.02 0.046 0.034 0.086
Industry of last contributory job
Primary or secondary sector -0.032 0.054 0.132 0.106
Trade/transport/communication 0.089* 0.054 0.310** 0.094
Public administr., defense, social security agencies -0.076 0.062 0.139 0.099
Other services -0.049 0.055 0.228** 0.092
No sector information ref. ref.
Cumulated unempl. duration during last five years
0<=since last emp.<18  months ref. ref.
18<=since last emp.<32  months 0.016 0.039 0.03 0.053
33<=since last emp.<45  months -0.085* 0.046 -0.064 0.077
since last emp.>=45  months -0.219** 0.05 -0.268** 0.084
Previous ALMP participation in last five years
Training 0.009 0.022 -0.076* 0.042
Start-up subsidy 0.170** 0.029 0.208** 0.057
Public works -0.223** 0.046 -0.341** 0.091
Regional variables (district level) in January 2005
Regional unempl. rate -0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.005
Share of long-term unemployment (SLU) -0.007** 0.002 -0.007** 0.003
%age change of SLU against previous year 0.001** 0.001 0.002* 0.001
Vacancy-unemployment ratio -0.158 0.549 -1.478 1.201
Constant -2.794** 0.192 -3.384** 0.251
N
pseudo-R2
130,255 97,701
 0.0461 0.0613  
* 10% sign. level, ** 5% sign. level, *** 1% sign. level 
1) Coefficients of dummies for a regional classification according to Rüb and Werner (2007) are omitted. 
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Table 4 
Probit coefficients of start-up scheme participation equation by region 
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Age in years
20 to 25 0.175** 0.078 0.182* 0.097
26 to 35 0.321** 0.063 0.234** 0.08
36 to 45 0.281** 0.062 0.144* 0.079
46 to 55 0.204** 0.062 0.05 0.08
56 to 62
Female -0.313** 0.033 -0.313** 0.039
Number of children
No child
One child 0.067** 0.034 0.063 0.043
Two children or more 0.081** 0.033 0.100** 0.046
Health limitation (1 = yes) -0.03 0.037 -0.046 0.055
Nationality: German -0.212** 0.027 -0.240** 0.049
Couple household 0.022 0.071 -0.028 0.059
Education
No degree
Secondary or higher school degree 0.054 0.035 -0.019 0.057
Secondary school degree with apprenticeship 0.164** 0.037 -0.036 0.061
Higher education 0.274** 0.039 0.174** 0.052
Partner Education
No degree -0.106 0.073
Secondary or higher school degree -0.079 0.072
Secondary school degree with apprenticeship -0.019 0.083
Higher education
missing 1: no IEB information on partner -0.104 0.076
missing 2: partner education missing in IEB -0.033 0.071
No degree 0.081 0.08
Secondary or higher school degree or apprent. -0.149** 0.07
Higher education
missing 1: no IEB information on partner 0.152 0.107
missing 2: partner education missing in IEB -0.023 0.077
Partner cumulated unempl. duration in last five years
less than 181 days 0.129** 0.046 -0.129* 0.078
181 to 360 days 0.032 0.065 0.129* 0.075
more than 360 days
Partner cumulated employment duration during last 
five years
Partner no empl. spell
less than 361 days 0.143** 0.05 0.061 0.071
more than 360 days 0.065 0.068 0.052 0.06
Cumulated employment duration during last five years
No employment spell 0.046 0.093 -0.13 0.1
less than 181 days
181 to 360 days 0.003 0.046 0.028 0.058
more than 360 days -0.070* 0.042 -0.041 0.05
West East
ref. ref.
ref. ref.
ref. ref.
ref.
ref. ref.
ref. ref.
ref. ref.
ref.
 
* 10% sign. level,  ** 5% sign. level, *** 1% sign. level 
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Table 4 continued 
Probit coefficients of start-up scheme participation equation by region1) 
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Want to work full-time 0.029 0.045 0.147* 0.082
Last professional status
No regular employment ever 0.065 0.07 0.023 0.091
Unskilled worker
Skilled-worker 0.093** 0.035 -0.017 0.045
White-collar 0.176** 0.036 0.181** 0.046
Non-classified 0.106** 0.042 -0.019 0.054
Last monthly real wage (deflated with CPI, 2000=100)
0 Euro <= last salary  < 400 Euro
400 Euro <= last salary <  1000 Euro 0.082 0.076 -0.239** 0.078
1000 Euro <= last salary < 1500 Euro 0.075 0.075 -0.189** 0.077
last salary >= 1500 Euro 0.093 0.075 -0.162** 0.079
Time since end of last contributory employment 
< 18 months
18 to 32 months 0.000 0.034 0.041 0.048
33 to 45 months -0.059 0.042 -0.036 0.059
more than 45 months 0.028 0.052 0.012 0.065
Industry of last contributory job
Primary or secondary sector 0.022 0.064 0.032 0.072
Trade/transport/communication 0.132** 0.063 0.203** 0.071
Public administr., defense, social security agencies 0.011 0.068 -0.047 0.082
Other services 0.025 0.064 0.052 0.071
No sector information
Cumulated unempl. duration during last five years
0<=since last emp.<18 months
18<=since last emp.<32 months 0.016 0.039 0.023 0.052
33<=since last emp.<45 months -0.067 0.049 -0.088 0.063
since last emp.>=45 months -0.173** 0.052 -0.287** 0.07
Previous ALMP participation in last five years
Training 0.017 0.024 -0.058* 0.033
Start-up subsidy 0.215** 0.032 0.118** 0.042
Public works -0.125** 0.058 -0.300** 0.055
Regional variables (district level) in January 2005
Regional unempl. rate -0.005 0.005 0.000 0.007
Share of long-term unemployment (SLU) -0.007** 0.002 -0.012** 0.004
%age change of SLU against previous year 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.001
Vacancy-unemployment ratio -0.367 0.508 0.795 2.099
Constant -3.012** 0.194 -2.557** 0.275
N
pseudo-R2 0.0591 0.0698
134,408 93,548
ref. ref.
ref. ref.
ref. ref.
ref. ref.
ref. ref.
West East
 
* 10% sign. level,  ** 5% sign. level, *** 1% sign. level 
1) Coefficients of dummies for a regional classification according to Rüb and Werner (2007) are omitted. 
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Table 5 
Mean standardised absolute bias1),2) 
Subsample before after
East Germany 15.13 2.49
West Germany 13.43 1.69
Male 11.70 1.35
Female 13.95 2.68
Age 25-45 12.46 1.27
Education: Secondary or  Higher 13.12 1.51
German 12.46 1.75
Foreign 14.96 1.96
Time since end of last regular job is more than 32 months or never 
regularly employed
12.72 1.49
Time since end of last regular job is less or equal to 32 months 10.63 1.97
 matching
 
1) Results from nearest neighbour matching with replacement (five neighbours). 
2) Standardised Bias: 
)]()([5.0/)(100 XVXVXX controlstreatcontrolstreat +⋅−⋅ . 
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Table 6 
Match quality for covariates – Men 
Control variables 
Matched All Matched before after
 Treated controls  controls
Age in years
20 to 25 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.39 0.93
26 to 35 0.35 0.24 0.35 0.00 0.92
36 to 45 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.06 0.66
46 to 55 0.20 0.28 0.19 0.00 0.60
56 to 62
Number of children
No child
One child 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.00 0.80
Two children or more 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.00 0.95
Health limitation (1 = yes) 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.98
Nationality: German 0.69 0.81 0.69 0.00 0.76
Couple household 0.44 0.37 0.43 0.00 0.71
Education
No degree
Secondary or higher school degree 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.08 0.62
Secondary school degree with apprenticeship 0.25 0.29 0.24 0.02 0.59
Higher education 0.34 0.25 0.34 0.00 0.98
Partner Education
No degree 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.16 1.00
Secondary or higher school degree 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.68 0.93
Secondary school degree with apprenticeship 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.29 0.93
Higher education
missing 1: no IEB information on partner 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.79
missing 2: partner education missing in IEB 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.58
Partner cumulated unempl. duration in last five years
less than 181 days 0.26 0.19 0.25 0.00 0.78
181 to 360 days 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.97
more than 360 days
Partner cumulated employment duration during last 
five years
Partner no empl. spell
less than 361 days 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.86
more than 360 days 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.62
Cumulated employment duration during last five 
years
No employment spell 0.30 0.40 0.31 0.00 0.58
less than 181 days
181 to 360 days 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.79
more than 360 days 0.43 0.36 0.43 0.00 0.88
Want to work full-time 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.60 0.75
ref.
ref.
ref.
ref.
Averages
matching
P-value of t-test on H0:
no differences between
 treated and controls
ref.
ref.
ref.
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Table 6 continued 
Match quality for covariates – Men 
Control variables 
Matched All Matched before after
 Treated controls  controls
Last professional status
No regular employment ever 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.59 0.45
Unskilled worker
Skilled-worker 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.70 0.83
White-collar 0.21 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.78
Non-classified 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.75
Last monthly real wage (deflated with CPI, 2000=100)
0 Euro <= last salary  < 400 Euro
400 Euro <= last salary <  1000 Euro 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.61 0.82
1000 Euro <= last salary < 1500 Euro 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.22 1.00
last salary >= 1500 Euro 0.34 0.26 0.34 0.00 0.84
Time since end of last contributory employment 
< 18 months
18 to 32 months 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.00 0.92
33 to 45 months 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.81 0.88
more than 45 months 0.26 0.36 0.26 0.00 0.96
Industry of last contributory job
Primary or secondary sector 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.88 0.75
Trade/transport/communication 0.25 0.15 0.25 0.00 0.88
Public administr., defense, social security agencies 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.80
Other services 0.21 0.23 0.19 0.12 0.51
No sector information
Cumulated unempl. duration during last five years
0<=since last emp.<18  months
18<=since last emp.<32  months 0.59 0.44 0.59 0.00 0.84
33<=since last emp.<45  months 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.02 0.93
since last emp.>=45  months 0.12 0.26 0.13 0.00 0.69
Previous ALMP participation in last five years
Training 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.28 0.95
Start-up subsidy 0.21 0.11 0.19 0.00 0.53
Public works 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.00 0.45
Regional variables (district level) in January 2005
Regional unempl. rate 16.20 17.17 16.25 0.00 0.87
Share of long-term unemployment (SLU) 35.49 36.99 35.58 0.00 0.80
%age change of SLU against previous year 1.52 3.26 1.47 0.03 0.96
Vacancy-unemployment ratio 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.82
ref.
ref.
ref.
ref.
Averages
ref.
P-value of t-test on H0:
no differences between
 treated and controls
matching
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Table 7 
Match quality for covariates – Women  
Control variables 
Matched All Matched before after
 Treated controls  controls
Age in years
20 to 25 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.39 0.84
26 to 35 0.30 0.22 0.32 0.00 0.71
36 to 45 0.40 0.33 0.37 0.01 0.52
46 to 55 0.20 0.28 0.22 0.00 0.67
56 to 62
Number of children
No child
One child 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.61 0.93
Two children or more 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.09 0.40
Health limitation (1 = yes) 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.79 0.60
Nationality: German 0.33 0.38 0.31 0.10 0.60
Couple household 0.14 0.29 0.13 0.00 0.76
Education
No degree
Secondary or higher school degree 0.15 0.29 0.14 0.00 0.73
Secondary school degree with apprenticeship 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.93 0.91
Higher education 0.56 0.31 0.55 0.00 0.94
Partner Education
No degree or secondary or higher school degree 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.90
Secondary school degree with apprenticeship 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.79 0.97
Higher education
Missing or no info /IEB info but no part. educ. 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.57
Partner cumulated unempl. duration in last five years
more than 360 days
less than 361 days 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.82 0.58
Partner cumulated employment duration during last 
five years
Partner no empl. spell
at least one day 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.71 0.58
Cumulated employment duration during last five 
years
No employment spell 0.43 0.57 0.43 0.00 0.92
less than 181 days
181 to 360 days 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.07 1.00
more than 360 days 0.35 0.25 0.35 0.00 0.94
Want to work full-time 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.65 0.95
ref.
ref.
ref.
ref.
ref.
ref.
ref.
Averages
P-value of t-test on H0:
 treated and controls
no differences between
matching
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Table 7 continued 
Match quality for covariates – Women  
Control variables 
Matched All Matched before after
 Treated controls  controls
Last professional status
No regular employment ever 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.17 0.83
Unskilled worker
Skilled-worker 0.30 0.19 0.29 0.00 0.66
White-collar 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.50 0.95
Non-classified 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.16 0.41
Last monthly real wage (deflated with CPI, 2000=100)
0 Euro <= last salary  < 400 Euro
400 Euro <= last salary <  1000 Euro 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.94 0.93
1000 Euro <= last salary < 1500 Euro 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.31 0.93
last salary >= 1500 Euro 0.20 0.09 0.20 0.00 0.95
Time since end of last contributory employment 
< 18 months
18 to 32 months 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.01 0.95
33 to 45 months 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.28 0.77
more than 45 months 0.27 0.35 0.23 0.01 0.38
Industry of last contributory job
Primary or secondary sector 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.41 0.82
Trade/transport/communication 0.27 0.14 0.27 0.00 0.94
Public administr., defense, social security agencies 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.87
Other services 0.22 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.64
No sector information
Cumulated unempl. duration during last five years
0<=since last emp.<18  months
18<=since last emp.<32  months 0.56 0.38 0.54 0.00 0.73
33<=since last emp.<45  months 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.29 0.82
since last emp.>=45  months 0.08 0.23 0.07 0.00 0.43
Previous ALMP participation in last five years
Training 0.38 0.39 0.35 0.82 0.44
Start-up subsidy 0.16 0.06 0.15 0.00 0.61
Public works 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.86
Regional variables (district level) in January 2005
Regional unempl. rate 16.96 17.68 17.11 0.05 0.78
Share of long-term unemployment (SLU) 35.61 36.91 35.64 0.00 0.96
%age change of SLU against previous year 4.09 4.86 4.11 0.64 0.99
Vacancy-unemployment ratio 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.79 0.68
ref.
ref.
ref.
ref.
P-value of t-test on H0:
no differences between
ref.
matching
Averages  treated and controls
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Table 8 
Match quality for covariates – West Germany  
Control variables 
Matched All Matched before after
 Treated controls  controls
Age in years
20 to 25 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.43 0.28
26 to 35 0.34 0.24 0.34 0.01 0.96
36 to 45 0.39 0.31 0.39 0.05 0.96
46 to 55 0.14 0.25 0.19 0.00 0.26
56 to 62
Female 0.19 0.41 0.20 0.00 0.83
Number of children
No child
One child 0.22 0.15 0.16 0.02 0.22
Two children or more 0.16 0.16 0.23 0.78 0.14
Health limitation (1 = yes) 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.77 0.17
Nationality: German 0.59 0.77 0.65 0.00 0.31
Couple household 0.48 0.35 0.44 0.00 0.50
Education
No degree
Secondary or higher school degree 0.33 0.34 0.24 0.82 0.11
Secondary school degree with apprenticeship 0.21 0.25 0.28 0.24 0.21
Higher education 0.27 0.16 0.33 0.00 0.28
Partner Education
No degree 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.72 0.58
Secondary or higher school degree 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.88 0.71
Secondary school degree with apprenticeship 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.21 0.47
Higher education
missing 1: no IEB information on partner 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.71
missing 2: partner education missing in IEB 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.49 0.72
Partner cumulated unempl. duration in last five years
less than 181 days 0.33 0.17 0.27 0.00 0.31
181 to 360 days 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.35 0.95
more than 360 days
Partner cumulated employment duration during last 
five years
Partner no empl. spell
less than 361 days 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.74
more than 360 days 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.50 0.83
Averages
P-value of t-test on H0:
matching
no differences between
 treated and controls
ref.
ref.
ref.
ref.
ref.
ref.
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Table 8 continued 
Match quality for covariates – West Germany 
Control variables 
Matched All Matched before after
 Treated controls  controls
Cumulated employment duration during last five 
years
No employment spell 0.27 0.43 0.27 0.00 1.00
less than 181 days
181 to 360 days 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.52
more than 360 days 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.02 0.77
Want to work full-time 0.94 0.86 0.93 0.01 0.73
Last professional status
No regular employment ever 0.14 0.23 0.12 0.02 0.58
Unskilled worker
Skilled-worker 0.18 0.11 0.18 0.02 0.90
White-collar 0.19 0.14 0.23 0.08 0.43
Non-classified 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.26 0.62
Last monthly real wage (deflated with CPI, 
2000=100)
0 Euro <= last salary  < 400 Euro
400 Euro <= last salary <  1000 Euro 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.74 0.73
1000 Euro <= last salary < 1500 Euro 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.53 0.18
last salary >= 1500 Euro 0.45 0.23 0.38 0.00 0.26
Time since end of last contributory employment 
< 18 months
18 to 32 months 0.14 0.17 0.22 0.42 0.10
33 to 45 months 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.10
more than 45 months 0.23 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.98
Industry of last contributory job
Primary or secondary sector 0.23 0.18 0.27 0.11 0.55
Trade/transport/communication 0.29 0.16 0.27 0.00 0.62
Public administr., defense, social security agencies 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.46 0.59
Other services 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.56 0.80
No sector information
Cumulated unempl. duration during last five years
0<=since last emp.<18 months
18<=since last emp.<32 months 0.57 0.44 0.62 0.00 0.42
33<=since last emp.<45  months 0.22 0.15 0.15 0.05 0.15
since last emp.>=45 months 0.10 0.19 0.12 0.01 0.64
Previous ALMP participation in last five years
Training 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.04 0.98
Start-up subsidy 0.23 0.08 0.17 0.00 0.23
Public works 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.94
Regional variables (district level) in January 2005
Regional unempl. rate 13.05 13.18 12.70 0.72 0.45
Share of long-term unemployment (SLU) 34.04 33.89 33.21 0.83 0.40
%age change of SLU against previous year -9.29 -11.46 -10.67 0.04 0.36
Vacancy-unemployment ratio 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.42 0.96
ref.
ref.
ref.
ref.
ref.
ref.
ref.
matching
Averages
P-value of t-test on H0:
no differences between
 treated and controls
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Table 9 
Match quality for covariates – East Germany  
no differences between
Control variables  treated and controls
Matched All Matched before after
 Treated controls  controls
Age in years
20 to 25 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.21 0.71
26 to 35 0.35 0.22 0.35 0.00 0.86
36 to 45 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.42 0.89
46 to 55 0.18 0.30 0.18 0.00 0.94
56 to 62
Female 0.26 0.45 0.26 0.00 0.76
Number of children
No child
One child 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.98 0.66
Two children or more 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.82 0.71
Health limitation (1 = yes) 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.02 0.79
Nationality: German 0.82 0.91 0.82 0.00 0.92
Couple household 0.40 0.42 0.38 0.50 0.51
Education
No degree
Secondary or higher school degree 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.03 0.95
Secondary school degree with apprenticeship 0.14 0.25 0.14 0.00 0.95
Higher education 0.58 0.43 0.59 0.00 0.82
Partner Education
No degree 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.76 0.63
Secondary school degree with apprenticeship 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.53
Higher education
missing 1: no IEB information on partner 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.60 0.58
missing 2: partner education missing in IEB 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.68 0.90
Partner cumulated unempl. duration in last five years
less than 181 days 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.57 0.72
181 to 360 days 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.76
more than 360 days
Partner cumulated employment duration during last 
five years
Partner no empl. spell
less than 361 days 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.91 0.89
more than 360 days 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.83 0.79
ref.
ref.
ref.
ref.
Averages
P-value of t-test on H0:
ref.
matching
ref.
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Table 9 continued 
Match quality for covariates – East Germany 
Control variables 
Matched All Matched before after
 Treated controls  controls
Cumulated employment duration during last five years
No employment spell 0.38 0.52 0.41 0.00 0.44
less than 181 days
181 to 360 days 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.93
more than 360 days 0.35 0.25 0.34 0.00 0.74
Want to work full-time 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.02 0.91
Last professional status
No regular employment ever 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.57 0.47
Unskilled worker
Skilled-worker 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.33 0.76
White-collar 0.24 0.15 0.24 0.00 0.81
Non-classified 0.11 0.21 0.10 0.00 0.53
Last monthly real wage (deflated with CPI, 2000=100)
0 Euro <= last salary  < 400 Euro
400 Euro <= last salary <  1000 Euro 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.19 0.46
1000 Euro <= last salary < 1500 Euro 0.21 0.17 0.20 0.02 0.70
last salary >= 1500 Euro 0.20 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.84
Time since end of last contributory employment 
< 18 months
18 to 32 months 0.18 0.12 0.16 0.00 0.53
33 to 45 months 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.86 0.93
more than 45 months 0.30 0.45 0.31 0.00 0.79
Industry of last contributory job
Primary or secondary sector 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.85 0.84
Trade/transport/communication 0.24 0.12 0.24 0.00 0.96
Public administr., defense, social security agencies 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.91
Other services 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.64 0.46
No sector information
Cumulated unempl. duration during last five years
0<=since last emp.<18  months
18<=since last emp.<32  months 0.58 0.38 0.57 0.00 0.80
33<=since last emp.<45  months 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.03 0.96
since last emp.>=45  months 0.11 0.30 0.11 0.00 0.91
Previous ALMP participation in last five years
Training 0.44 0.48 0.43 0.05 0.86
Start-up subsidy 0.20 0.10 0.19 0.00 0.60
Public works 0.09 0.27 0.06 0.00 0.26
Regional variables (district level) in January 2005
Regional unempl. rate 22.60 22.96 22.43 0.03 0.49
Share of long-term unemployment (SLU) 39.25 40.10 39.01 0.00 0.42
%age change of SLU against previous year 25.76 26.28 24.03 0.64 0.30
Vacancy-unemployment ratio 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.54
ref.
matching
ref.
ref.
ref.
ref.
ref.
no differences between
 treated and controlsAverages
P-value of t-test on H0:
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Table 10 
Treatment effects at 12 and 20 months after programme start for several outcome variables and samples (in percentage points)1) 
Outcome
East Germany -5.9 *** -8.8 *** 34.9 *** 21.1 ***
West Germany -8.1 *** -11.4 *** 28.2 *** 19.6 ***
Male -6.7 *** -10.1 *** 30.8 *** 20.1 ***
Female -6.0 * -8.7 ** 29.0 *** 19.1 ***
Age 25-45 -7.9 *** -10.6 *** 32.7 *** 22.0 ***
Education: Secondary or  Higher -6.3 *** -8.6 *** 28.2 *** 19.8 ***
German -6.4 *** -9.3 *** 29.7 *** 19.0 ***
Foreign -7.1 *** -13.7 *** 31.5 *** 21.9 ***
Time since end of last regular job is more than 32 months or never regularly employed -4.4 *** -5.3 *** 30.9 *** 19.5 ***
Time since end of last regular job is less or equal to 32 months -9.8 *** -16.6 *** 28.2 *** 17.6 ***
Outcome
East Germany 45.9 *** 31.9 *** 8.3 *** 11.2 ***
West Germany 38.3 *** 26.9 *** 13.7 *** 16.3 ***
Male 41.4 *** 28.1 *** 12.9 *** 15.0 ***
Female 41.0 *** 25.8 *** 7.8 * 11.2 **
Age 25-45 41.1 *** 29.7 *** 13.2 *** 16.1 ***
Education: Secondary or  Higher 40.0 *** 28.6 *** 10.9 *** 13.4 ***
German 40.9 *** 27.6 *** 10.4 *** 12.5 ***
Foreign 40.4 *** 26.0 *** 15.6 *** 15.0 ***
Time since end of last regular job is more than 32 months or never regularly employed 42.8 *** 27.6 *** 9.9 *** 12.6 ***
Time since end of last regular job is less or equal to 32 months 35.5 *** 22.4 *** 12.7 *** 12.9 ***
neither registered as
not registered as unemployed no receipt of UB II
12th 20th 12th 20th 
months after programme start months after programme start
 contributory employment  unemployed nor as job-seeker
12th 20th 12th 20th  
months after programme start months after programme start
unsubsidised
 
* 10% sign. level, ** 5% sign. level, *** 1% sign. level 
1) Results from nearest neighbour matching with replacement (five neighbours). 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of the propensity score by gender 
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Figure 2 
Distribution of the propensity score by region 
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Figure 3 
ATT of business start-up programme including 95 percent confidence bands by gender (in percentage points) 
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Figure 4 
ATT of business start-up programme including 95 percent confidence bands by region (in percentage points) 
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